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1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocol analysis is a well-developed subject, with many tools
and rigorous techniques that can be used to determine what confidentiality,
authentication (among others, [RGL16a, EMM09, Bla02, CM12]), and indistin-
guishability properties (e.g. [Bla04, BAF08, CCcCK16]) that a protocol satisfies.
However, protocols are used to support security functionality required by
the applications that use those protocols. Those applications may have access
control and authorization goals, and the real criterion for whether a proto-
col is good enough for that usage is whether these application-level require-
ments are always met. For instance, in the TLS resumption attacks [RRDO10],
cf. [BDLF+14, RGL16b], the protocol did not allow the server application to
distinguish unauthenticated input at the beginning of a data stream from subse-
quent authenticated input. This may lead to erroneous authorization decisions.
Another area in which application behavior affects protocol goals concerns
environmental assumptions. For instance, some protocols fail if the same long-
term key is ever used by a principal when playing the server role, and it has
been used when playing a client role. However, an application may ensure that
no server ever needs to execute the protocol in the client role at all. This policy
would ensure that an otherwise weak protocol reliably supports the needs for
the application.
Logical Protocol Analysis is our term for combining a protocol analyzer with
these additional concerns, which we analyze via model finding. Our goal is to
analyze cryptographic protocols that include trust axioms that cannot be stated
using the typical input to a protocol analyzer such as cpsa.
An Example: DoorSEP. We turn next to a motivating scenario, complete
details of which may be found in Section 2.2. We begin here by describing the
protocol, called the Door Simple Example Protocol (DoorSEP). It is derived
from an expository protocol due to Bruno Blanchet [Bla08], who designed it
to have a weakness. We will illustrate conditions under which, despite this
weakness, the protocol achieves the needs of the application.
Imagine a doorD which is equipped with a badge reader, and a person P who
is equipped with a badge. When the person swipes the badge, the cryptographic
protocol is executed. The door and person are each identified by the public part
of an asymmetric key pair, with D−1 and P−1 being the respective principal’s
private keys. We write {|M |}K for the encryption of message M with key K. A
message M is signed by P by encrypting with P ’s private key ({|M |}P−1).
The person initiates the exchange by creating a fresh symmetric key K,
signing it, and sending it to the door encrypted with the door’s public key. The
door extracts the symmetric key after checking the signature, freshly generates
a token T , and sends it to the person encrypted with the symmetric key. The
person demonstrates they are authorized to enter by decrypting the token and
sending it as plain text to the door. DoorSEP may be expressed in Alice and
Bob notation:
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P → D : {|{|K|}P−1|}D
D → P : {|T |}K
P → D : T.
An analysis of DoorSEP by cpsa shows an undesirable execution of this
protocol. Assume the person’s private key P−1 is uncompromised and the door
has received the token it sent out. In this situation, cpsa will deduce that
person P freshly created the symmetric key K. However, there is nothing in
this protocol to ensure that the person meant to open door D. If adversary A
gets P to use compromised door D′, the adversary can perform a man-in-the-
middle attack:
P → A : {|{|K|}P−1 |}D′
A→ D : {|{|K|}P−1 |}D
D → A : {|T |}K
A→ D : T.
Without additional assumptions, the door cannot authenticate the person re-
questing entry.
But think about this situation: Can we trust the person to swipe her badge
only in front of the door that matches the badge? Can we ensure that that door
has an uncompromised private key? If so, then the adversary cannot exercise
the flaw.
We regard this as a trust assumption, and we can express it as an axiom:
If an uncompromised signing key P−1 is used to prepare an instance
of the first DoorSEP message, then its owning principal has ensured
that the selected door D has an uncompromised private key.
The responsibility for ensuring the truth of this axiom may be split between
the person and the organization controlling the door. The person makes sure
to swipe her badge only at legitimate doors of the organziation’s buildings.
The organization maintains a security posture that protects the corresponding
private keys.
Is DoorSEP good enough given the trust axiom?
To analyze this protocol with this trust assumption we rely on model finding.
We provide a theory to Razor that generates a model that specifies the man-
in-the-middle attack. To the theory, we add an axiom that states that when a
person generates a symmetric key, that person will use an uncompromised key
to encrypt its first message. The axiom makes it so that the adversary cannot
decrypt the message sent by the person.
The generated model can be given to cpsa. It infers that the only way the
door can decrypt the person’s message is if the person encrypted the message
using the door’s public key. Once that inference is made, the door can conclude
that the person sent the messages expected in a run of this protocol.
DoorSEP was constructed with a flaw for expository purposes. The protocol
can be repaired by including the door’s public key in the signed content, by
making the first message {|{|K,D|}P−1 |}D.
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Flawed protocols are often deployed, and may be embedded in widely used
devices before the flaws are understood. This example shows that such protocols
can still achieve desired security goals when used in a restricted context. If the
context can be modeled using trust axioms, Logical Protocol Analysis can be
used to check whether the goals are in fact met in the context of use.
Protocols and theories. Hence, security conclusions require protocol anal-
ysis combined with other properties, which we will assume are characterized
axiomatically by a theory G. In the DoorSEP case, it is generated by the trust
axiom. We also regard a protocol Π as determining an axiomatic theory Th(Π),
namely the theory of Π’s executions, as Π runs possibly in the presence of a
malicious adversary. The models of this theory are runs of the protocol. Thus,
we would like to understand the joint models of G ∪ Th(Π), where of course
these theories may share vocabulary.
The enrich-by-need strategy. Indeed, our approach is to construct mini-
mal models in a homomorphism order. We refer to these minimal models as
shapes [Gut11]. The shapes show all of the minimal, essentially different things
that can happen subject to G ∪ Th(Π): every execution contains instances—
meaning homomorphic images—of the shapes. This is useful to the security
analyst who can inspect the minimal models and appraise whether they are
compatible with his needs. The analyst can do this even without being able
to explicitly state the key security goals. In the case in which G = ∅, so
that only Th(Π) matters, generating these shapes is the central functionality of
cpsa [RGL16a].
We call this approach to security analysis enrich-by-need, since we build
homomorphism-minimal models by rising stepwise in the homomorphism or-
der, gradually generating them all. cpsa does so using a “authentication test”
method, which yields a compact, uniform way to generate the set of minimal
models of the protocol theory [Gut11, LRT11].
Indeed, a further advantage arises in the case where there is a finite set
of finite shapes. In that case, we can summarize them in a sentence, called a
shape analysis sentence constructed as the disjunction of their diagrams [Gut14,
Ram12]. The diagram of a finite model is (roughly) the conjunction of the
atomic formulas true in it. The shape analysis sentence is thus true in all of the
shapes. Moreover, its syntactic form ensures that its truth will be preserved by
homomorphisms. Thus, it will be true in all models of G ∪ Th(Π). Indeed, no
strictly stronger formula can be true in all the models. We regard the shape
analysis as a security goal achieved by G ∪ Th(Π).
Thus, finding a finite set of finite shapes determines a strongest security goal
that the system achieves.
We already have a special tool, called cpsa [RG17], that computes the shapes
and their sentences for a protocol Π acting alone. It uses optimized algorithms
that we have proved correct for protocol analysis [Gut11, LRT11]. Thus, we
need to extend it so that it can cooperate with another tool to adapt its results
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to provide models of the whole theory G ∪ Th(Π). We effectively split Th(Π)
into two parts, a hard part Th and an easy part Te. Only cpsa will handle the
hard part.
Our strategy is to program Z3 [DMB08] to look for minimal models of G∪Te
that extend a fragment of a model. When the resulting model A contains
additional behavior of Π, we return to cpsa to handle the hard part Th, enriching
A with some possible executions. We then return these extensions to Z3. If this
process terminates, we have a minimal joint model. By iterating our search, we
obtain a covering set of minimal joint models.
The program that orchestrates this use of Z3 is called Razor. It adapts the
ideas of an earlier program of the same name [SDD15].
Contributions. This report has two goals. First, we define and justify the
methods that the new Razor uses to drive Z3 to generate homomorphism-
minimal models of a given theory. These homomorphisms are not necessarily
embeddings; that is, a homomorphism to construct may map distinct values
in its source model to the same value in its target model. To begin with, we
need a method to construct, from a model A, a set of sentences avoidA, true in
precisely those models B such that there is no homomorphism from A to B. We
also need a method to construct, from a model A, a set of sentences homToA,
true in precisely those models B such that there is a homomorphism from B to
A. We show how to use these two resources to compute a set of minimal models
that covers all of the models; this method is codified in Razor.
Second, we develop a particular architecture for coordinating Razor and
cpsa. In this architecture, Razor handles all aspects of G ∪ Th(Π) except that
it does not enrich a fragmentary execution of Π to obtain its shapes, i.e. the
minimal executions that are its images. Instead, we generate an input to cpsa
that contains the substructure A0 containing only protocol behavior. cpsa
computes the shapes and extracts the strongest security goal that applies to A0.
It returns this additional information to Razor, which then iterates. We call
this cooperative architecture lpa for Logical Protocol Analysis.
Conclusions. We draw two main conclusions. First, Razor uses Z3 effectively
to extract minimal models of a variety of theories. This is particularly true if
the theories do not contain many nested universal quantifiers. Moreover, the
lpa coordination between cpsa and Razor is sound.
Second, when Razor and cpsa are used together as in lpa, Z3 must handle
theories with a fairly large number of nested universal quantifiers. Therefore
this method is practical in its current form only for quite small examples. Re-
fining the approach may enable us to generate theories—possibly quantifier-free
theories—that are smaller and more easily digested by Z3.
Structure of this report. We organize the report into two main chapters.
Chapter 2 introduces the theories Th(Π), explains the way that lpa marshals
Razor and cpsa together. Chapter 3 describes Razor’s strategies to use Z3 for
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finding minimal models, relative to a given theory T . Chapter 4 summarizes
and concludes.
Within Chapter 2, we introduce strand space theory and give its axiomatic
presentation in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we introduce an example that uses
Blanchet’s Simple Example Protocol as a tool in an authorization decision,
namely whether to open a locked door. The protocol is chosen so that it would
not necessarily be sound. However, the analysis shows that the protocol is good
enough given an additional application-specific trust assumption. This is the
assumption that, every time an authorized principal interacts with a door, that
door complies with the protocol and preserves the secrecy of the values it is
given. This illustrates how protocol analysis may be crafted to an application-
specific context.
Within Chapter 3, we lay the foundations in Section 3.1, focusing on core
models. These are canonical homomorphism-minimal submodels, which have
embeddings into their homomorphic images. We are, however, more interested
in homomorphisms that may not be embeddings; we introduce this notion of
minimality in Section 3.2. This section shows how to compute minimality mod-
els in either the embedding sense or the sense of all homomorphisms. We then
turn from the theory to the implementation considerations of working with the
SMT solver Z3 or other SMT2-lib-compliant solvers. Section 3.5 gives numerical
results for DoorSEP and some other small examples.
2 Model Finding Modulo Strand Space Theory
This chapter shows how to use the model finders presented in Chapter 3 and
Strand Spaces [THG99] to analyze cryptographic protocols. The implications
of trust policies expressed in first-order logic can be analyzed by studying their
models. A trust policy that includes a theory about a cryptographic protocol
allows one to determine the impact of the policy on the execution of a protocol.
However, deducing protocol executions is not something that can be efficiently
done within an smt solver. An external, finely tuned tool is called for.
The Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer [RG17] (cpsa) is a tool that
can be used to determine if a protocol achieves authentication and secrecy goals.
It performs symbolic cryptographic analysis based on the Dolev-Yao adversary
model [DY83] and Strand Spaces. Determining if a protocol satisfies a goal is an
undecidable problem, however, cpsa appears to have a performance advantage
over other tools by using forward reasoning based on solving authentication
tests [GT02].
cpsa begins an analysis with a description of a protocol and an initial sce-
nario. The initial scenario is a partial description of the execution of a protocol.
If cpsa terminates, it computes a description of all of the executions of the pro-
tocol consistent with the initial scenario. For example, if it is assumed that one
role of a protocol runs to completion and cpsa terminates, cpsa will determine
what other roles must have executed.
Associated with each cpsa protocol Π is a first-order language L(Π) used to
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Figure 1: lpa Architecture
specify security goals [Gut14]. The language can be used to exchange informa-
tion between cpsa and an smt solver.
A security goal is a sentence with a special form. It is a universally quantified
implication. Its hypothesis is a conjunction of atomic formulas. Its conclusion
is a disjunction of existentially quantified conjunctions of atomic formulas. Se-
curity goals can be used to express authentication and secrecy goals.
cpsa describes a set of executions with an object called a skeleton. A skele-
ton that explicitly describes all of the non-adversarial behavior in each execution
is called a realized skeleton. Skeletons are presented in Section 2.1.2.
A Tarski style semantics, one that uses a skeleton as a model for a sentence,
is defined for each goal language. A security goal is achieved by a protocol
if every realized skeleton models the goal. The goal language is presented in
Section 2.1.3.
For use with smt solvers, there is a theory TΠ for protocol Π. When this
theory is included, models restricted to L(Π) characterize a skeleton of Π. The
theory associated with a protocol is presented in Section 2.1.5.
The goal language used by lpa is strand-oriented as opposed to being node-
oriented. The distinction is presented in Section 2.1.6 along with the motivation
for choosing a strand-oriented language.
There is a special security goal that can be extracted from the results of
a run of cpsa. A Shape Analysis Sentence (sas) [Ram12] encodes everything
that has been learned about the protocol from a cpsa analysis starting with a
given initial scenario. A sas is used to import the results of a cpsa analysis
into the smt solver.
The architecture for combining an smt solver with cpsa, called the Logical
Protocol Analyzer (lpa), is displayed in Figure 1. Theories are expressed using
smt-lib 2.5 syntax. An analysis begins with a cpsa protocol Π and an initial
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theory T0. The initial theory contains a specification of the trust policy and
a description of the initial scenario of the protocol as a collection of sentences
in L+(Π), an extension of L(Π).
The program prot2smt2 extracts the protocol theory TΠ. The initial theory
is appended to the protocol theory to form the first theory T1 to be analyzed by
Razor, the model finder. A skeleton is extracted from each model. If the skeleton
is realized, the model describes the impact of the trust policy on complete
executions of the protocol. If the skeleton is not realized, it is used as the
initial scenario for cpsa. The results of cpsa is turned into a sas and added
to the current theory for further analysis. The lpa algorithm is presented in
Section 2.1.4. An example of the use of lpa is in Section 2.2.
The performance of lpa is not good. Model finding consumes a large amount
of cpu time, even for small problems. Section 3.5 presents the results from
running our test suite and an analysis of lpa’s performance issues.
2.1 Strand Space Theory
This section describes the theory behind the strand-oriented implementation
of lpa. Unlike [Gut14], this paper uses many-sorted first order logic, which
is a better match for existing software tools. This paper incorporates much
from [Ram12]. Unlike [Ram12], this paper uses one-based sequence indexing.
Notation. A finite sequence is a function from an initial segment of the posi-
tive integers (Z+). The length of a sequence X is |X |, and sometimes we write
sequence X = 〈X(1), . . . , X(n)〉 for n = |X |. The prefix of sequence X of
length n is X † n.
2.1.1 Message Algebras
Sorts: M, T, S, A
Functions: (·, ·) :M×M→ M Pairing
{| · |}S(·) :M× S→ M Symmetric encryption
{| · |}A(·) :M× A→ M Asymmetric encryption
(·)−1 : A→ A Asymmetric key inverse
tt : T→ M Text inclusion
sk : S→ M Symmetric key inclusion
ak : A→ M Asymmetric key inclusion
Equation: (x−1)−1 = x for x : A
Figure 2: Simple Crypto Algebra Signature
Figure 2 shows the simplification of the cpsa message algebra signature used
by lpa. Sort M is the sort of messages. The other sorts, sort A (asymmetric
keys), sort S (symmetric keys), and sort T (text), are called basic sorts.
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t ⊢ t t1, sk(t2) ⊢ {|t1|}St2
t1, t2 ⊢ (t1, t2) {|t1|}St2 , sk(t2) ⊢ t1
(t1, t2) ⊢ t1 t1, ak(t2) ⊢ {|t1|}
A
t2
(t1, t2) ⊢ t2 {|t1|}St2 , ak(t
−1
2 ) ⊢ t1
Figure 3: Adversary Derivability Relation
A message constructed by applying a term of a basic sort to an inclusion
function is call a basic value. Messages are generated from the basic values
using encryption {| · |}
{S,A}
(·) and pairing (·, ·), where the comma function is right
associative and parentheses are omitted when the context permits.
A set of variables X is well-sorted if for each x ∈ X , x has a unique sort S.
Let x : S assert that the sort of x is S in X . Suppose X and Y are well-sorted
and contain x. The sort of x in X need not agree with the sort of x in Y .
Let A(X) be the quotient term algebra generated by a set of well-sorted
variables X . We often leave the set of variables implicit, and refer to the carrier
set for sort S by AS.
A message t1 is carried by t2, written t1 ⊑ t2 if t1 can be derived from t2
given the right set of keys, that is ⊑ is the smallest reflexive, transitive relation
such that t1 ⊑ t1, t1 ⊑ (t1, t2), t2 ⊑ (t1, t2), and t1 ⊑ {|t1|}t2 .
Adversary behavior is modeled via a derivability relation. Given a set of
messages S, message t is derivable, written S ⊢ t, when there is a derivation
using the rules in Figure 3. These rules encode the Dolev-Yao model [DY83].
2.1.2 Strand Spaces
A run of a protocol is viewed as an exchange of messages by a finite set of local
sessions of the protocol. Each local session is called a strand. A strand is a finite
sequence of events. An event is either a message transmission or a reception.
Outbound message t ∈ AM is written as +t, and inbound message t is written
as −t. A message originates in a strand if it is carried by some event and the
first event in which it is carried is outbound. A message is acquired in a strand
if it is carried by some event and the first event in which it is carried is inbound.
A strand space Θ is a finite sequence of strands. A message that originates in
exactly one strand of Θ is uniquely originating, and represents a freshly chosen
value. A message is mentioned in Θ if it occurs in a strand of Θ, or if it is
an asymmetric key, its inverse occurs in a strand of Θ. A message that is
mentioned but originates nowhere in Θ is non-originating, and often represents
an uncompromised key.
A node identifies an event in a strand space. A node is a pair of positive
integers, and the event associated with node (s, i) is evtΘ(s, i) = Θ(s)(i). We
sometimes omit the strand space when it is obvious from the context. The set
of nodes of strand space Θ is
N (Θ) = {(s, i) | s ∈ Dom(Θ), i ∈ Dom(Θ(s))}.
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〈−x,−y,+(x, y)〉 〈−(x, y),+x,+y〉 Pair
〈−x,− sk(y),+{|x|}y〉 〈−{|x|}y,− sk(y),+x〉 Symmetric
〈−x,− ak(y),+{|x|}y〉 〈−{|x|}y,− ak(y−1),+x〉 Asymmetric
〈+ tt(x)〉 〈+ sk(x)〉 〈+ ak(x)〉 Create
Figure 4: Penetrator Roles
The strand succession relation is the binary relation ⇒ : N (Θ) × N (Θ),
such that
(s1, i1)⇒ (s2, i2) iff s1 = s2 and i1 + 1 = i2.
An execution is called a bundle. A bundle B(Θ,→) is a strand space Θ and
a binary communication relation → : N (Θ)×N (Θ), such that
1. the graph with N (Θ) as vertices and ⇒ ∪→ as edges is acyclic;
2. if n0 → n1, then evt(n0) = +t and evt(n1) = −t for some t; and
3. for each reception node n1, there is a unique transmission node n0 with
n0 → n1.
The node precedence relation of B, ≺B = (⇒ ∪→)+, is a strict partial ordering
of nodes and represents the causal relation between events that occur at nodes
in B. In a bundle, a strand that is an instance of a role in Figure 4 is called
a penetrator strand, and the remaining strands are regular. In what follows,
we assume all regular strands precede penetrator strands in the sequence of
strands Θ, that is, if Θs is regular and Θs′ is a penetrator strand, then s < s
′.
A skeleton represents all or part of the regular portion of an execution. A
skeleton k = kX(Θ,≺, ν, υ), where X is a set of well-sorted variables used to
generate the message algebra used by Θ, ≺ is a strict partial ordering of the
nodes in Θ, ν is a set of basic values mentioned in Θ, none of which is carried
in a strand in Θ, and υ is a set of pairs consisting of a basic value and a node.
For each (t, n) ∈ υ, t originates at n in Θ and at no other node. In addition, ≺
must order the node for each event that receives a uniquely originating basic
value after the node of its transmission, so as to model the idea that the basic
value represents a value freshly generated when it is transmitted.
Skeleton k = kX(Θ,≺, ν, υ) is the skeleton of bundle B(Θ
′,→) if
1. Θ = Θ′ † n, where n is the number of regular strands in Θ′;
2. ≺ is the restriction of ≺B to N (Θ);
3. ν is the set of non-originating basic values in Θ; and
4. υ is the set of uniquely originating basic values and their node of origina-
tion in Θ.
Let k = kX(Θ,≺, ν, υ) and k′ = kX′(Θ′,≺′, ν′, υ′) be skeletons. There is a
skeleton homomorphism (ϕ, σ) : k 7→ k′ if ϕ and σ are maps with the following
properties:
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1. ϕ maps strands of k into those of k′, and nodes as ϕ(s, i) = (ϕ(s), i), that
is ϕ is in Dom(Θ)→ Dom(Θ′);
2. σ : A(X)→ A(X ′) is a message algebra homomorphism;
3. n ∈ N (Θ) implies σ(evtΘ(n)) = evtΘ′(ϕ(n));
4. n0 ≺ n1 implies ϕ(n0) ≺′ ϕ(n1);
5. σ(ν) ⊆ ν′;
6. (t, n) ∈ υ implies (σ(t), ϕ(n)) ∈ υ′.
Skeleton k covers bundle B if there exists a homomorphism from k to the skele-
ton of B. Skeleton k is realized iff there is an injective homomorphism to the
skeleton of some bundle that preserves the length of strands.
A protocol Π is a strand space with restrictions and a theory. The details
of the theory of Π, written TΠ, will be presented in the next section. A strand i
of Π, written Πi is called a role. A role is a strand where every variable of
sort message that occurs in the strand is acquired. Strand s is an instance of
role Πi if s is a prefix of the result of applying some substitution σ to Πi. Every
protocol contains the listener role 〈−x,+x〉 for x :M.
Skeleton k is a skeleton of protocol Π if each strand in Θ is an instance of a
protocol role, and k models theory TΠ as defined in the next section.
2.1.3 Protocol Formulas
The signature Σ(Π) used for strand-oriented protocol (sop) formulas includes
of the sorts and functions in the underlying message algebra. There are two
additional sorts: D, the sort for strands and I, the sort for indices. A node is
never explicitly represented, instead it is represented as a pair consisting of a
strand and an index.
sop formulas make use of protocol specific and protocol independent predi-
cates. For each role Πi, there is a protocol specific binary strand length predicate
Πi : D × I. For each role Πi and variable x : S that occurs in Πi, there is a
protocol specific binary strand parameter predicate Πxi : D × S. The protocol
independent unary predicates are nonB : B for each basic sort B ∈ {T, S,A}.
The ternary protocol independent predicates are uniqAtB : B × D × I. The
quaternary protocol independent predicate is prec : D × I × D × I. Equality is
part of the signature. Finally, there is a constant of sort I for each index in the
longest role of the protocol. Thus, suppose the longest role has length n, then
1 : I, 2 : I, . . . , n : I are constants in the signature.
Semantics of Protocol Formulas. Let k = kX(Θ,≺, ν, υ). The universe of
discourse D contains a set for each sort in Σ(Π). For sort D, DD is the domain
of Θ. DI is the set of integers that correspond to the constants of sort I. The
universe of discourse DS for each algebra sort S is A(X)S .
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When formula Φ is satisfied in skeleton k with variable assignment α:Y → D,
we write k, α |=Π Φ. We write α¯ when α is extended to terms in the obvious
way. When sentence Γ is modeled by skeleton k, we write k |=Π Γ.
• k, α |=Π Πi(y, j) iff for some s = α(y) and σ, s is in the domain of Θ, and
Θs † α¯(j) = σ(Πi † α¯(j)).
• k, α |=Π Π
x
i (y, t) iff for some s = α(y) and σ, s is in the domain of Θ, x
first occurs in Πi at j, and for some σ with σ(x) = α¯(t),
Θs † j = σ(Πi † j).
The interpretation of the protocol independent predicates is straightforward.
• k, α |=Π prec(yd, yi, zd, zi) iff (α(yd), α¯(yi)) ≺ (α(zd), α¯(zi)).
• k, α |=Π nonT(t) iff tt(α¯(t)) ∈ ν.
• k, α |=Π nonS(t) iff sk(α¯(t)) ∈ ν.
• k, α |=Π nonA(t) iff ak(α¯(t)) ∈ ν.
• k, α |=Π uniqAtT(t, yd, yi) iff (tt(α¯(t)), (α(yd), α¯(yi))) ∈ υ.
• k, α |=Π uniqAtS(t, yd, yi) iff (sk(α¯(t)), (α(yd), α¯(yi))) ∈ υ.
• k, α |=Π uniqAtA(t, yd, yi) iff (ak(α¯(t)), (α(yd), α¯(yi))) ∈ υ.
• k, α |=Π y = z iff α¯(y) = α¯(z).
Associated Protocol Theories. In addition to a sequence of roles, proto-
col Π has an associated theory TΠ. For example, the axiom
∀x : D, b : T.Π1(x, 1) ∧ Π
n
1 (x, b) ⊃ uniqAtT(b, x, 1)
states that the n parameter of an instance of role Π1 always uniquely originates
at its first node.
2.1.4 Logical Protocol Analysis
The protocol theory of protocol Π, Tr(Π) is:
Tr(Π) = Υ(Π) ∪ {Γ | for all realized k, k |=Π Γ},
where Υ(Π) is the theory of Π-skeletons presented in Section 2.1.5.
For each protocol Π, ideally one would like to perform model finding mod-
ulo Th(Π). The lpa program performs our approximation.
The inputs to lpa are a protocol Π and an initial theory T0. The signature
of the initial theory, Σ¯(Π) may extend the signature of protocol formulas with
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new sorts, functions, and predicates. The additional functions and predicates
are treated as uninterpreted symbols.
SupposeMmodels Γ (M |= Γ). We denote byM⇓ Σ(Π) the reduct ofM to
Σ(Π) by restricting it to interpret only symbols in Σ(Π). Assume each element
in the domain of model M is distinct from a function in Σ¯(Π). Let Σ¯(Π)+ be
the extension of Σ¯(Π) in which each element in the model is a constant of the
appropriate sort. The positive diagram of M, D(M), is the set of all of the
atomic Σ¯(Π)+ sentences modeled by M.
Given a set of atomic Σ(Π)+ Φ sentences, Guttman [Gut14, Section 4.3] de-
scribes when and how one can extract a skeleton k = cs(Φ) that is characterized
by Φ.
lpa starts with theory T1. It is the union of initial theory T0, TΠ, and Υ(Π),
the Π-skeleton theory presented in Section 2.1.5.
Algorithm 1. lpa performs the following procedure to output a set of models.
lpa(T ) ≡
1. Let Mi be a set of minimal models of T . If T is unsatisfiable, abort.
2. For each Mi do:
(a) Γ ← D(Mi ⇓ Σ(Π)). If Γ is not role specific, signal initial theory
error and abort.
(b) If cs(Γ) is realized, output Mi.
(c) Use cs(Γ) as the point-of-view for cpsa and compute the resulting
shape analysis sentence ∆ using the algorithm in [Ram12].
(d) lpa(T ∪ {∆}).
2.1.5 Skeleton Axioms
This section presents the Π-skeleton theory, Υ(Π), used to form an initial theory
by lpa. For performance reasons, the signature used omits the message sort M
along with all message algebra functions that refer to that sort. The only
message algebra function that remains is asymmetric key inverse (·)−1. This
simplification of the protocol signature was necessary because model finders
attempt to create an infinite domain for the message sort using the obvious
specification.
There are three new binary predicates introduced in this section, predi-
cates carriedAtB : B × D × I, for each basic sort B ∈ {T, S,A}. Formula
carriedAtT(b, x, i) asserts that text b is first carried in strand x by the message
at position i. Finally, there is an index precedence predicate ≪ : I× I.
In what follows, prec(·, ·, ·, ·) is written as (·, ·) ≺ (·, ·).
1. All message functions are injective.
∀mn : A. m−1 = n−1 ⊃ m = n.
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2. For k : A, k−1 6= k and (k−1)−1 = k.
3. Index constants enumerate the sort. For all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
∀x : I. ∃i. x = ci and ci 6= cj when i 6= j.
4. Index constants are linearly ordered. For all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
ci ≪ cj iff i < j.
5. Uniquely originating values originate at at most one node:
∀v : S, xy : D, ij : I. uniqAtS(v, x, i) ∧ uniqAtS(v, y, j)
⊃ x = y ∧ i = j,
for S ∈ {T, S,A}.
6. Carried implies not non-origination:
∀v : S, x : D, i : I. carriedAtS(v, x, i) ∧ nonS(v) ⊃ false,
for S ∈ {T, S,A}.
7. Precedence is strict:
∀x : D, i : I.(x, i) 6≺ (x, i)
∀xyz : D, ijk : I.(x, i) ≺ (y, j) ∧ (y, j) ≺ (z, k) ⊃ (x, i) ≺ (z, k).
8. Strand succession rule:
∀x : D, ijk : I.(x, i) ≺ (x, k) ∧ i≪ j ∧ j ≪ z
⊃ (x, i) ≺ (x, j) ∧ (x, j) ≺ (x, k).
9. Node of unique origination is before carried node:
∀v : S, x, y : D, i, j : I. uniqAtS(v, x, i) ∧ carriedAtS(v, y, j)
⊃ (x = y ∧ i = j) ∨ (x, i) ≺ (y, j),
for S ∈ {T, S,A}.
10. Strand predecessor node exists for Πi:
∀x : D, hj : I.Πi(x, h) ∧ j ≪ h ⊃ (x, j) ≺ (x, h).
11. Non-overlapping role pairs respect node positions:
• If Πi † 1 does not unify with Πj † 1,
∀x : D, hk : I.Πi(x, h) ∧ Πj(x, k) ⊃ false.
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• If ℓ is the largest position such that Πi † ℓ unifies with Πj † ℓ,
∀x : D, hk : I.Πi(x, h) ∧ Πj(x, k) ∧ cℓ ≪ h ∧ cℓ ≪ k ⊃ false.
12. Parameter first occurrence node:
• If v : S first occurs in Πi at 1,
∀x : D, h : I.Πi(x, h) ⊃ ∃m : S.Π
v
i (x,m).
• If v : S first occurs in Πi at ℓ, where ℓ > 1,
∀x : D, h : I.Πi(x, h) ∧ cℓ−1 ≪ h ⊃ ∃m : S.Π
v
i (x,m).
13. There is at most one value for each parameter:
∀x : D,mn : S.Πvi (x,m) ∧ Π
v
i (x, n) ⊃ m = n.
14. Assert first carried node:
Assume basic value b : S is first carried in Πi at ℓ, v is the variable that
occurs in b, and n = m if b = v else n = m−1.
• If ℓ = 1,
∀x : D, h : I,m : S.Πi(x, h) ∧ Π
v
i (x, n) ⊃ carriedAt(n, x, c1).
• If ℓ > 1,
∀x : D, h : I,m : S.Πi(x, h) ∧ cℓ−1 ≪ h ∧ Πvi (x, n)
⊃ carriedAt(n, x, cℓ).
Let Υ(Π) be the collection of axioms listed above in this section. Observe
that Υ(Π) is geometric. Let Γ be a Σ¯(Π) sentence. Model M is a k skeleton
model of Γ, written M |=k Γ, iff
M |= Γ ∧Υ(Π) and k = cs(D(M ⇓ Σ(Π))).
2.1.6 Strand-Oriented vs. Node-Oriented Goal Languages
A goal language is strand-oriented if non-algebra logical variables denote strands.
A goal language is node-oriented if non-algebra logical variables denote nodes.
In the original work on goal languages [Gut14], all languages are node-
oriented. Node-oriented languages are to be preferred when considering protocol
transformations, that is, when mapping one protocol into a larger protocol, and
ensuring the goals in the source protocol are properly reflected in the target pro-
tocol. cpsa version 3 [RGL16a] provides a node-oriented goal language. The
first implementation of lpa used cpsa3 and a node-oriented goal language.
The goal language presented is Section 2.1.3 is strand-oriented. Strand-
oriented languages have the advantage that they are more compact and easier
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Figure 5: DoorSEP Protocol
to understand. Furthermore, they align more naturally with cpsa input and
output, which itself is strand-oriented. cpsa version 4 [RG17] provides a strand-
oriented goal language. The reason cpsa4 came into existence is not due to
positive features of strand-oriented languages, but instead it was to mitigate
the lpa performance issues. Strand-oriented models of skeletons produced by
Z3 are smaller than node-oriented models. Section 3.5 contains an example
in which a strand-oriented analysis is sixteen times faster that a node-oriented
analysis.
2.2 Door Simple Example Protocol
We present the DoorSEP Protocol example, and its analysis in full detail based
on the foundation presented in the previous section. In this example, imagine
there is a door with a badge reader, and a person with a badge. The door has
opened. We want to know what else must have happened.
Recall the diagram in Figure 1 to visualize the analysis process.
To begin this analysis, we must know how the person’s badge was used to
authenticate. We employ the protocol in Figure 5, which has been designed to
have a flaw. It is based on the Simple Example Protocol due to Bruno Blanchet.
It fails to achieve mutual authentication, however, we will add a trust axiom
that restores this property.
In this protocol, a person begins by generating a fresh symmetric key, signing
it, and then encrypting the result using the door’s public key. If the door
accepts the first message, it responds by freshly generating a token and uses the
symmetric key to encrypt it. If the door receives the token back unencypted,
the door concludes the person that generated the key is at the door and opens.
The initial theory specifies the trust axiom and the fact that the door is
open. To assert the door is open, one asserts there is a strand that is a full length
instance of the door role by declaring constant s :D and asserting door(s, c3). We
further assume a person’s private key is uncompromised by declaring constant
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∃i0, i1, i2 : I, s0 : D, a0, a1, a2, a3 : A, k0 : S, t0 : T.
i0 = c1 ∧ i1 = c2 ∧ i2 = c3 ∧ i0 ≪ i1 ∧ i0 ≪ i2 ∧ i1 ≪ i2
∧ a1 = a0−1 ∧ a0 = a1−1 ∧ a3 = a2−1 ∧ a2 = a3−1 ∧ s0 = s ∧ a2 = p
∧ door(s0, i2) ∧ door
t(s0, t0) ∧ door
k(s0, k0) ∧ door
p(s0, a2) ∧ door
d(s0, a0)
∧ uniqAtT(t0, s0, i1) ∧ carriedAtT(t0, s0, i1) ∧ carriedAtS(k0, s0, i0)
∧ (s0, i0) ≺ (s0, i1) ∧ (s0, i0) ≺ (s0, i2) ∧ (s0, i1) ≺ (s0, i2) ∧ nonA(a3)
Figure 6: DoorSEP First Model
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p : A, and asserting doorp(s, p) and nonA(p−1). The trust axiom is
∀p, d : A, s : D. nonA(p−1) ∧ person(s, c1)
∧ personp(s, p) ∧ persond(s, d) ⊃ nonA(d−1).
(1)
and will be explained later.
After appending the initial theory to the Skeleton Axioms for the DoorSEP
protocol specified in Section 2.1.5, Razor finds the model in Figure 6. The
first line declares the set of elements in the domain. The second line shows the
properties we depend on for integers. The third line shows that we have two
pairs of asymmetric keys. The forth line asserts we have an instance of the door
role of full length. The remainder asserts properties of basic values and the
orderings implied by strand succession.
At this stage, we have a model that characterizes an unrealized skeleton, and
we would like to use cpsa to find out what else must have happened. Ignoring
atomic formulas using the predicates carriedAtT, carriedAtS, and ≪ produces a
model in the language of the DoorSEP protocol. The Skeleton Axioms ensure
the extraction of a skeleton that can be used as an initial cpsa scenario. The
shape produced by cpsa is displayed in Figure 7.
The shape shows the lack of mutual authentication built into this flawed
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∀t0 : T, k0 : S, a0, a2 : A, s0 : D.
door(s0, c3) ∧ door
t(s0, t0) ∧ door
k(s0, k0) ∧ door
d(s0, a0)
∧ doorp(s0, a2) ∧ nonA(a2−1) ∧ uniqAtT(t0, s0, c2)
⊃ ∃s1 : D, d : A.
person(s1, c1) ∧ personk(s1, k0) ∧ persond(s1, d0)
∧ personp(s1, a0) ∧ (s0, c1) ≺ (s1, c1) ∧ uniqAtS(k0, s1, c1)
Figure 8: DoorSEP First sas
protocol. To open the door, a person can use an arbitrary compromised key
for the door. That is, without the trust axiom, the answer to the what else
happened question is that the person holding private key p−1 swiped with their
badge, but the key used to identify the door may have been compromised, and
an adversary may have completed the rest of the protocol.
Consider the case in which the door is well known to the owner of the badge.
For example, suppose the badge is issued by the institution that owns the door
and is tamper proof. In that case, the person knows to initiate the DoorSEP
protocol (swipe their badge) only when in front of a door with the correct key.
The trust axiom in Eq. 1 codifies this policy. It states that if a person with an
uncompromised key initiates the protocol, the door key used is uncompromised.
The next step in the analysis makes use of the trust axiom. The result of the
cpsa analysis is transformed into the sas shown in Figure 8. The antecedent
specifies the initial scenario described by the first model. The consequence
specifies what else must be added to make the initial scenario into the complete
execution show in Figure 7.
When the sas is added to the current theory, Razor finds one model. The
skeleton extracted from this model is very similar to the shape in Figure 7 with
one crucial difference: the keyD′ is uncompromised. This skeleton is unrealized,
so cpsa can make a contribution. It finds a sas that extends the length of the
person strand to full length and equates D and D′. The addition of this sas
produces a model that characterizes a realized skeleton with full agreement
between the door and person strands. Because the skeleton is realized, cpsa
has nothing more to contribute and the analysis terminates.
3 Finding Minimal Models
Below we will assume familiarity with basic ideas and results from first-order
mathematical logic; notions that are not defined here are treated in any text on
logic. There are some variations in the formalities of different presentations in
the literature, but definitions in the SMT-Lib standard [BFT16] line up partic-
ularly well with our notation.
In this chapter we present some of the foundations of model-finding, focusing
on the use of a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver. In broadest terms,
model-finding is the following task: given a logical theory T , produce one or
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more (finite) models of T .
Of course a typical satisfiable theory will have many models. Special empha-
sis is given in this chapter to the question of which models should be presented
to the user? One answer—embodied in the lpa tool—is based on the fun-
damental notion of homomorphism between models, with a special emphasis
on models that are minimal (see Section 3.2) in the pre-order determined by
homomorphism.
Section 3.3 addresses some of the strategies we evolved in programming
against an SMT solver.
3.1 Foundations
3.1.1 Language
We work with many-sorted first-order logic. Concretely, we implement the logic
defined in the SMT-Lib standard, version 2, as described in [BST+10]. This
logic is not order-sorted: sorts are all disjoint, and models must have all sort-
interpretations be non-empty.
The SMT-LIB language adopts the convention that all expressions are terms,
and the “formulas” are, by convention, terms of sort Bool. For software-
engineering reasons we have found it beneficial to work with terms and formulas
as separate types. The translation is straightforward, of course, and so Razor
does the following
• when theories are loaded from user’s input files (or intermediate files cre-
ated by our tool), the theory is translated from a “term-based” one to a
“term-and-formula–based” one, which is manipulated internally;
• when theories are sent to the SMT solver they are translated back to being
a “term-based” one
Certain classes of formulas and theories play a special role in our tool.
Definition 2 (PE formula, Geometric theory). A formula is positive-existential,
or PE, if it is built from atomic formulas (including true and false) using ∧, ∨
and ∃.
A theory T is geometric if has an axiomatization in which each axiom is of
the form
∀~x. α(~x)→ β(~x)
where α and β are positive-existential.
3.1.2 Models
Fix a signature Σ. A modelM for signature Σ will be called a Σ-model ; notation
M |= Σ.
Let T be an Σ-theory. We are interested in categories of models of T ; for
the most part we only consider finite models.
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Notation 3. If α is a formula with free variables among x1, . . . , xn and a1, . . . , an
are elements of a model A we will sometimes write A |= α[a1, . . . , an] as short-
hand to mean that A |= α(x1, . . . , xn) under the environment sending each xi
to ai.
Definition 4 (Diagram, Characteristic Sentence). Let M be a finite model
over signature Σ. Expand the signature Σ by adding, for each element e of the
domain of M, a constant ce, and let M+ be the corresponding expansion of M.
The diagram ∆M of M is the set of atomic sentences and negations of atomic
sentences true in M+. If we take only the atomic sentences, the result is the
positive diagram ∆+
M
of M.
The sentence—in the original signature Σ—obtained by converting the new
constants in the positive diagram to variables and existentially quantifying them
is called the characteristic sentence chM of M.
If we enrich chM with a suitable conjunct expressing the fact that the el-
ements named by the constants are all distinct, we obtain the i-characteristic
sentence chiM of M.
3.1.3 Homomorphisms
Definition 5. Let A and B be Σ-models. A function h : |A| → |B| is a homo-
morphism if
1. A |= f [a1, . . . , an] = a implies B |= f [h(a1), . . . , h(an)] = h(a) and
2. A |= R[a1, . . . , an] implies B |= R[h(a1), . . . , h(an)].
It is a strong homomorphism if the second condition is replaced by1
2’ A |= R[a1, . . . , an] if and only if B |= R[h(a1), . . . , h(an)].
( The first condition is already equivalent to “if and only if.”)
Definition 6. A homomorphism from a model to itself is called an endomor-
phism.
An embedding e : A→ B is a strong homomorphism which is injective.
An isomorphism f : A → B is a homomorphism such that there is a homo-
morphism g : B→ A with g ◦ f = idA and f ◦ g = idB.
Note that an isomorphism is not the same as a bijective homomorphism (it
is the same as a bijective strong homomorphism). On the other hand:
Lemma 7. Let A and B be finite. If h : A → B and g : B → A are injective
homomorphisms, then they are isomorphisms.
1Caution: some authors use the term “homomorphism” to mean our “strong homomor-
phism.”
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Proof. It will be enough to prove that h is an isomorphism. We use the following
elementary fact: if f : X → X is an injective set-theoretic function on a finite
set, then for some n, fn : X → X is the identity.
So consider g ◦ h : A→ A. This is an injection, so for some n, (g ◦ h)n is the
identity on A. So (g ◦ h)n−1 ◦ g is h−1. Since this function is a composition of
homomorphisms, it is a homomorphism. Thus h is an isomorphism.
3.1.4 Categories of Models
Since the identity map is injective and injective maps are closed under compo-
sition, the class of Σ-models under injective maps makes a category.
Notation 8.
• MΣ is the category of all finite models of Σ with arbitrary homomor-
phisms.
Write A - B (sometimes B % A) if there is a MΣ map h : A→ B.
Write A ≈ B if A - B and B - A.
Write A  B if A - B and not B - A.
• MiΣ is the category of all finite models of Σ with injective homomorphisms.
Write A -i B (sometimes B %i A) if there is a MiΣ map h : A→ B.
Write A ≈i B if A -i B and B -i A.
Write A i B if A -i B and not B -i A.
Both - and -i are preorders.
Note that if A -i B then A is isomorphic to a (not necessarily induced)
submodel of B.
Definition 9. Model B is a submodel of A if |B| ⊆ |A| and the inclusion function
is a homomorphism.
A submodel B is a proper submodel of A if B 6= A: this can happen
if either |B| 6= |A| or for some tuple [a1, . . . , an], RA[a1, . . . , an] fails while
RB[(a1), . . . , (an)] holds.
Model B is an induced submodel of A if |B| ⊆ |A| and the inclusion function
is a strong homomorphism.
Definition 10. If M is a class of Σ-models and M0 ⊆ M say that M0 is a
MΣ set of support for M if for all B ∈ M, there exists A ∈ M0 with A - B.
Similarly for MiΣ.
3.1.5 Well-foundedness of the homomorphism preorder
We will often add axioms to a theory to ensure that there is an upper bound
on the size of its models. In such a case there will be only finitely many models
of T .
22
Lemma 11. Let T be a theory with only finitely many models. Then the  and
i orders on models of T are well-founded.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that we have an infinite descending
chain of strict homomorphisms:
. . .  M2  M1  M0
Then we have Mi+k  Mi for any k ≥ 0. Since T has finitely many models, we
eventually get i and k ≥ 0 with Mi+k+1 isomorphic to Mi. So Mi+k+1  Mi+1.
But that implies Mi  Mi+1, a contradiction.
The same argument applies to -i as well.
3.1.6 Homomorphisms and Logical Form
Theorem 12. The following are equivalent, for a formula α(~x):
1. α is preserved by homomorphism: if h : A → B is a homomorphism, and
~a is a vector of elements from A such that A |= α[~a], then B |= α[ ~ha].
2. α is logically equivalent to a PE formula.
3. α is equivalent, in the category MΣ of finite models, to a PE formula.
Proof. The equivalence of (1) and (2) is a classical result in model theory when
considering arbitrary models. The equivalence of (1) and (3) is a deep result of
Rossman [Ros08].
Lemma 13. Let M and N be arbitrary models.
• The following are equivalent.
1. M - N.
2. N |= chM.
3. chN |= chM.
• The following are equivalent.
1. M -i N.
2. N |= chiM.
3. chiN |= ch
i
M.
Proof. For the assertions about unconstrained homomorphisms:
(1) implies (2): Any function h : |M| → |N| determines a way to instantiate
in N the existentially quantified variables in chM. When h is a homomorphism,
this instantiation will make the body of chM true, essentially by definition of
homomorphism.
(2) implies (1): Suppose N |= chM. Then the instantiation of the existentially
quantified variables in chM determines a function h : |M| → |N|. The fact that
this instantiation makes the body of chM true implies that h is a homomorphism.
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(1) implies (3): Suppose M - N. We want to show that for any P, P |= chN
entails P |= chM. By the equivalence of (1) and (2) it suffices to show that
N - P entails M - P. Since M - N this follows from transitivity of - .
(3) implies (2): this is clear, since N is a model of chN.
The proofs for the injective case are almost identical. The additional factor
is that the “distinctness” assertions in the i-characteristic sentences ensure that
the homomorphisms considered are injective.
3.1.7 Retractions and Cores
The notion of the core of a model is standard; it is important for us because
cores give canonical representatives of ≈ equivalence classes.
Core are defined in terms of retractions, as follows.
Definition 14. A retraction r : A → B is a homomorphism such that there is
a homomorphism e : B→ A with r ◦ e = idB.
The following are well-known facts about retractions. If r is a retraction then
r is surjective and the corresponding e is injective. Indeed e is an embedding
(though r need not be a strong homomorphism).
If r is an endomorphism then r is a retraction if and only if r is idempotent:
r ◦ r = r; this is to say that r is the identity on its image.
It is false in general that if A is a model of T then a retraction of A is a
model of T . But it does hold if T is geometric.
Lemma 15. Let T be a geometric theory, A |= T , and r : A→ B a retraction.
Then B |= T .
Proof. Let e : A→ B satisfy r ◦ e = idB. Consider an axiom σ of T true in A
σ ≡ ∀~x. α(~x)→ β(~x)
where α and β are positive-existential formulas. To show σ is true in B, consider
a tuple~b of elements such that α[~b] is true in B. Since PE formulas are preserved
by homomorphisms, A |= α[~eb]. Since A |= σ, A |= β[~eb]. Since PE formulas
are preserved by homomorphisms, B |= β[ ~reb]. Since r ◦ e = idB, B |= β[~b], as
desired.
The following will be useful later.
Lemma 16. If A is finite and h : A→ A is an endomorphism then some power
of h is a retraction.
Proof. By induction on the size of A. If h is injective, then some power of h is
the identity, a retraction.
Otherwise suppose that h(e) = h(e′) for some e, e′ ∈ |A|. Let A′ be the
image of h, and let h′ be h restricted to |A′|.
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Then |A′| < |A| and h′ is an endomorphism of A′. By induction, for some
n, (h′)n is a retraction. It follows that h2n is a retraction; to show that it is
idempotent we calculate:
h2n ◦ hn2 = h3n ◦ hn
= (h′)3n ◦ hn since h ◦ h = h′ ◦ h
= (h′)n ◦ hn since (h′)2n = (h′)n
= h2n since h′ ◦ h = h ◦ h
Corollary 17. If h : A→ A is a non-injective endomorphism then some power
of h is a proper retraction.
The corollary was observed by Gottlob in [Got05]. It is useful in computing
cores, as we will see later.
Definition 18. A submodel C of A is a core of A if there is a retraction
r : A→ C but no retract r′ : A→ C′ for any proper submodel C′ of C.
A model C is a core if it is a core of itself.
By Lemma 15, if T is a geometric theory, and A is a model of T then the
core of A is a model of T .
The following are well-known (see, for example, [HN92] in the case of graphs).
Lemma 19. Let A be finite.
1. A has a core.
2. If C is a core of A then A ≈ C.
3. A core of A is an induced submodel of A.
4. C is a core if and only if it has no proper retracts.
5. C is a core if and only if it has no proper endomorphisms (equivalently, ev-
ery endomorphsim of C is an embedding; equivalently every endomorphsim
of C is an automorphism).
6. A submodel C of A is a core of A if there is an endomorphism h : A→ C
but no endomorphism A→ C′ for any proper submodel C′ of C.
7. If C and C’ are cores of a model A then C and C’ are isomorphic.
Proof.
1. This holds for simple cardinality reasons.
2. This holds by definition of retraction.
3. This holds since the retraction is the identity on the core.
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4. This is immediate from the definition.
5. By Lemma 16, a model C has no proper retracts if and only if it has no
proper endomorphisms. Now apply the previous part.
6. If C is a core of A then by definition there is an endomorphism h : A→ C;
if there were h′ : A→ C′ to a proper submodel C′ of C then by Lemma 16,
there would be a retraction to C’, contradicting the definition of core.
If h : A → C but there is no endomorphism A → C′ for any proper
submodel C′ of C, then C itself has no proper endomorphisms, so by part
5, C is a core.
7. Suppose r : A → C and r′ : A → C′ are retracts. Consider the map
r ↾C′ , r restricted to C’. This is a homomorphism from C’ to C. Similarly
r′ ↾C: C→ C′. The composition (r ↾C′) ◦ (r′ ↾C) is an endomorphism of C,
hence is injective. The composition in the other order is injective as well,
so, as observed in Lemma 7, each is an isomorphism.
3.1.8 Computing Cores
Testing whether a model is a core is NP-complete. So computing cores is appar-
ently difficult, from a worst-case complexity perspective. But it is not difficult,
using an SMT solver, to write a program that behaves well in practice.
Definition 20. If M is a finite model for signature Σ, the sentence endoM, over
the signature Σh that extends Σ by adding a new function symbol hs : S → S
at each sort S, is the conjunction of
• the diagram of M,
• the sentence expressing “h is a homomorphism”, and
• the sentence expressing “h is not injective.”
Algorithm 21 (ComputeCore).
input: model M over signature Σ
output: a core P of M
initialize: Set P to be M
while endoP is satisfiable
let P′ be a model of endoP;
let P0 be the image of endoP in P’;
let P be the reduct of P0 to the original signature Σ
return P
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Lemma 22. Algorithm 21 computes a core of its input.
Proof. The algorithm terminates because the size of the model P decreases at
each iteration. The resulting model is a core by part 5 of Lemma 19.
3.2 Minimality
Definition 23. Let M be a class of models closed under homomorphisms.
A model A is i-minimal for M if it is a minimal element in the -i preorder
on models in M. Equivalently, whenever B -i A then B ≈i A.
A model A is a-minimal for M if it is a minimal element in the - preorder
on models in M. Equivalently, whenever B - A then B ≈ A.
Typically we are interested in the case when M is the class of models of a
theory T ; in this case we may use the phrases T -minimal, or T -i-minimal.
Here are some local characterizations of i-minimality.
Lemma 24. The following are equivalent for a model A in M.
1. A is i-minimal for M.
2. No proper submodel of A is in M.
3. Whenever B is in M and k : B→ A is an injective homomorphism, then
h is an isomorphism.
Proof. For 1 ⇒ 2, if B were a proper submodel of A in M then the inclusion
map would contradict i-minimality of A.
For 2 ⇒ 3, suppose k : B→ A is injective, with B ∈ M. The image of k in
A is isomorphic with B, hence is in M, so by 2 is not a proper submodel.
The implication 3 ⇒ 1 is easy.
3.2.1 Submodel-minimality
One could imagine yet another notion of minimality, where the preorder on
models is given by the submodel relation. This notion could be described with-
out any reference to homomorphisms (the notion of submodel could be defined
natively, although we have not done so): for a theory T , a model A of T is
“submodel-minimal” for T precisely if no proper submodel of A is a model of
T .
But Lemma 24 says that this notion is precisely the same as i-minimality.
This observation will be useful when we turn to computing i-minimal models.
3.2.2 Relationships between a-minimal and i-minimal
An i-minimal model is not necessarily a-minimal.
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Example 25. Let T be
∃x.P (x) ∧ ∃x.Q(x)
Let A have one element a with
A |= P [a] ∧Q[a]
Then A is i-minimal but not a-minimal. The model B with two elements a1
and a2 such that
B |= A[a1] ∧B[a2]
is strictly below A in the - preorder. (B is a-minimal for T .)
An a-minimal model is not necessarily i-minimal.
Example 26. Let T be
∃x.P (x)
Let A have two elements a1 and a2 with
A |= P [a1] and A |= P [a2]
Then A is a-minimal. But A is not i-minimal: the induced model determined
by a1 is a model of T .
However, an a-minimal model which is a core will be i-minimal.
Lemma 27. If A is a-minimal for T and is a core, then A is i-minimal for T .
Proof. Suppose B is a model of T and j : B → A is injective. Since A is a-
minimal, there is a homomorphism h : A → B. The composition j ◦ h is an
endomorphism of A. Since A is a core this map is injective, so h is injective,
and A ≈i B.
Lemma 27 is attractive in the sense that it suggests striving for the best
of both worlds (i-minimality and a-minimality simultaneously) by computing
a-minimal cores. Unfortunately, if a theory T fails to be geometric then the
core of a model of T can fail to be a model of T . Thus we cannot in general
construct cores in our model-finding.
Example 28. Let T be the theory that says ∃x.P (x) and that there exist exactly
two elements (the latter sentence is not geometric). The model M with two
elements, with P holding of each of them, is a-minimal, but not i minimal. The
model with two elements and P holding of just one of them is i-minimal. The
core of M has one element, with P holding, but this is not a model of T .
i-minimizing an a-minimal model Suppose M is a-minimal. Let K be
an i-minimal model below M, that is, K is i-minimal and there is an injective
h : K→ M. Then K is both i-minimal and a-minimal. It is a-minimal because
it is a-hom equivalent to M (we have h : K→M by assumption, and there is a
map M→ K by virtue of M being a-minimal). So the true best of both worlds
is: first a-minimize, then i-minimize.
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3.2.3 Computing i-minimal Models
As noted in Lemma 24, finding an i-minimal model for T which is -i given a
model M is equivalent to finding a minimal submodel of M satisfying T .
This leads to the following procedure, originally developed for use in the
Aluminum tool [NSD+13]
• fix the universe
• fix the negative literals
• negate some positive literals
until no change.
Recall that δC is a sentence expressing the fact that every element of the
domain(s) of a model is named by a constant in C.
For this algorithm we use the notation flipP to denote
∧
{¬α | α is an atomic sentence, P |= ¬α}
∧
∨
{¬β | β is an atomic sentence, P |= β}
Note in particular that if c and c′ are constants naming distinct elements of a
model P, then c 6= c′ is one of the conjuncts of flipP.
Algorithm 29 (i-Minimize).
input: theory T and model M |= T
output: model P |= T such that N is i-minimal for T and P -i M
initialize: set P to be M
while T ′
def
= T ∪ {flipP} is satisfiable
set P to be a model of T ′
return P
Lemma 30. Algorithm 29 is correct: if M is a finite model of T then Algo-
rithm 29 terminates on M, and the output P is an i-minimal model of T with
P -i M
Proof. Each iteration goes down in the i ordering, thus termination. To show
that the result is i-minimal for T , it suffices, by Lemma 24, to argue that the
result is a minimal T -submodel of the input, under the submodel ordering. But
this is clear from the definition of the sentences flip .
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3.2.4 Computing a-minimal Models
What about computing a-minimal models? That’s harder. First of all, for
a given theory there might be no finite a-minimal models at all. Example:
the theory with one unary function and no axioms. The initial (hence unique
minimal) model of this theory is the natural numbers. Another way to put this
is: the  preorder is not well-founded in general.
If we bound the size of the domain(s) of our models then a-minimal models
exist: the  preorder is well-founded, so the set of minimal elements with respect
to this order is non-empty. The question is, how to compute a-minimal models?
We show how to do two things
1. Given model A define a sentence homToA such that B |= homToA if and
only if B - A.
2. Given model A define a sentence homFromA such that B |= homFromA if
and only if A - B.
We define avoidA to be ¬homFromA, so that B |= avoidA if and only if
A 6- B.
Then the process of finding an a-minimal model for T below a given model A is
to iterate the process of constructing a model that is strictly below A in the -
ordering, which is to say, a model B such that there is a homomorphism from
B to A but not homomorphism from A→ B.
That is:
given A |= T , construct the theory
T ∪ {homToA} ∪ {avoidA}
If this is unsatisfiable then A is T minimal. If this is satisfiable, let
A’ be a model of this theory, and iterate.
Important: this process is not guaranteed to terminate for an arbitrary T .
But as observed earlier, if at the outset we bound the size of the models to be
considered, the process will terminate.
The challenge—suggested earlier—is to define hom-to and hom-from sen-
tences with as much “existential” character as we can manage.
3.2.5 Hom To
This is straightforward “solver programming”.
Given model M. We want to characterize those B such that there is a hom
h : B→M, by constructing a sentence homToM.
Algorithm 31 (HomTo).
input: model M over signature Σ.
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output: sentence homToM in an expanded signature Σ
+, such that for
any model P |= Σ, P - M iff there is an expansion P+ of P to Σ+ with
P+ |= homTomM .
define Σ+ to be the extension of Σ obtained by
adding a set of fresh constants in one-to-one correspondence with the
elements of the domain of M
adding a function symbol hS : S → S at each sort S
define homToM as the conjunction of the following sentences, one for each
function symbol f and predicate R in Σ.
∀~x, y. f~x = y =⇒
∨
{( ~hx = ~e ∧ y = e′) |M |= f~e = e′} (2)
∀~x. R~x = true =⇒
∨
{( ~hx = ~e) |M |= R~e = true} (3)
Lemma 32. Suppose M and B are Σ models. There is a Σ hom h : B→M iff
there is a model B+ |= homToM such that B is the reduction to Σ of B+.
Proof. Suppose B is the reduction of B+ |= homToM. The interpretation of h
in B+ defines a function from |B| to |M|. We want to show h is actually a Σu
hom. But that’s just what homToM does.
Suppose B |= Σ and there is a hom h : B→M. We want to show that there
is an expansion B+ of B satisfying B |= homToM. The actual homomorphism h
determines the interpretation in B+ of the symbol h and the interpretation of
the new constants c′. And since h is a homomorphism, the clauses in homToM
are satisfied.
3.2.6 Hom From and Avoid Cone
Our goal is: given a model M, find a formula to capture not being in the
hom-cone of M.
This is more interesting that the hom-to problem, because we are going to
negate the sentence we build, to express hom-cone-avoidance. So we want to
minimize the number of existential quantifiers we use here.
The ideal outcome would be to construct an existential sentence capturing
the complement of the hom cone of M. Equivalently we might look for a struc-
ture B such that for any A, M - A iff A 6- B. This is called “homomorphism
duality” in the literature. Such a structure doesn’t always exist; and even when
it does, it can be exponentially large in the size of M [EPTT17]. So we turn to
heuristic methods.
The strategy is to construct a sentence guaranteed to capture the hom-from
problem, then refine this sentence to eliminate (some) quantifiers.
Start with the C-rules of the standard model rep for M
equations f~c→ c
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where the c are over ΣuK but there is exactly once c per element.
Convert that to the Σ sentence
repM
def
= ∃~x, f~u = u
by replacing the c by variables.
Lemma 33. Let M and F be Σ models. Then M - F iff F |= repM.
Proof. If there is a hom h :M→ F: use the fact that homomorphisms preserve
positive existential formulas. (The image of h on the ~x says how to interpret
the ~x in F.)
If F |= repM : since there is one variable per element ofM, the interpretation
of the ~x says how to define a function h : |M| → |F|. The fact that the equations
comprising the body of repM completely describe the graphs in M of the non-
Boolean functions of Σ and the tuples making the predicates true in M ensure
that h makes a homomorphism.
That’s fine, but there are as many existential quantifiers in repM as there
are domain elements. If we were to take homFromM to be repM, and define
avoidM by simply negating this would lead to a sentence inconvenient for the
SMT solver. We can compress the representation, though. This will lead to a
nicer representation sentence, which we will take as homFrommM .
Algorithm 34 (HomFrom).
input: model M over signature Σ
output: sentence homToM over signature Σ, such that for any model
P |= Σ, M - P iff P |= homFromM.
comment: sentence homFromM is designed to use as few existential quan-
tifiers as possible, in a “best-effort” sense.
initialize: Set sentence homFromM to be repM, the standard model rep-
resentation sentence for M.
while there is a conjunct in the body of homFromM of the form
f(t1, . . . , tn) = x
such that x does not occur in any of the ti,
replace all occurrences of x in homFromM by f(t1, . . . , tn). Erase the
resulting trivial equation f(t1, . . . , tn) = f(t1, . . . , tn) and erase the
(∃x) quantifier in front.
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Lemma 35. For any model P |= Σ, M - P iff P |= homFromM.
Proof. By Lemma 33 the assertion is true at the initialization step. So it suffices
to observe that each transformation of homFromM yields a logically equivalent
sentence.
We may write homFromM as
∃xy1 . . . yn.f(t1, . . . , tn) = x ∧ β(x, ~y)
so that the transformed sentence is
∃y1 . . . yn.β[x := f(t1, . . . , tn)](~y)
Suppose P satisfies the first sentence with environment η = x 7→ a, ~y 7→ ~b. Then
P satisfies the second sentence with η′ = ~y 7→ ~b, since P |= f(t1, . . . , tn) = x
under η.
Suppose P satisfies the second sentence with environment δ = ~y 7→ ~b. Then P
satisfies the first sentence with δ′ = x 7→ f(δt1, . . . δtn), ~y 7→ ~b (this is a suitable
environment because x does not occur in f(t1, . . . , tn).)
Example 36. Start with (suppressing the ∧ between equations)
∃x0x1x2 . fx0 → x2
fx1 → x0
fx2 → x1
c→ x2
If we work on the equations in the order given we get
∃x0x1 . fx1 → x0
ffx0 → x1
c→ fx0
∃x1 . fffx1 → x1
c→ ffx1
and the end result is ∃x1 . (fffx1 = x1) ∧ (c = ffx1).
The order in which we do these rules matters. Here is an improved algorithm
for applying the rules.
Construct a graph in which the nodes are the variables occuring in the set of
equations, and in which, if fx1 . . . xn → x is a rule, then there is an edge from
each xi to x. Then start at the (definitions for the) sources of this graph, and
proceed along the graph, that is optimal (conjecture).
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Example 37. With the same starting point as above:
∃x0x1x2 . fx0 → x2
fx1 → x0
fx2 → x1
c→ x2
Making the graph as defined above we have a2 is a source, then a1 then a0. If
we do things in that order we get
∃x0x1 . fx0 → c
fx1 → x0
fc→ x1
∃x0 . fx0 → c
ffc→ x0
fffc→ c
This is ideal.
There is an interesting connection here with initial models, that is, those
models that are free, in the categorical sense, over the empty set of generators,
among all the models of a theory. For such a model, (i) everything named by a
closed term, (ii) no equations between elements that are not forced by T , (iii)
no predicate facts true that are not forced by T . If M is initial then there is
a hom from it to any model, so the compressed representation sentence could
just be “true”.
In general the measure of how much a model fails to be initial is given (i)
elements not named by terms, (ii) unforced equations between elements (iii)
unforced atomic sentences. Capturing those facts about a model characterizes
the homs possible out of it; this is what the compressed representation does.
3.2.7 Computing a-minimal Models
Our work on homTo and homFrom leads to an algorithm for a-minimality.
Algorithm 38 (a-Minimize).
input: theory T and model M |= T
output: model P |= T such that P is a-minimal for T and N -M
initialize: set P to be M
while T ′
def
= T ∪ {homToP} ∪ {avoidP} is satisfiable
set P to be a model of T ′
return P
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3.2.8 Computing a Set-of-Support
This is another application of the avoidA technique. Given theory T and model
A, if we construct the theory T ′
def
= T ∪ {avoidA} then calls to the SMT solver
on theory T ′ are guaranteed to return models of T outside the hom-cone of A if
any exist. So a set-of-support for T can be generated by iterating this process.
Completeness of this strategy does not require that the models A we work
with are minimal. But if we do work with minimal models there will be fewer
iterations.
When Σ is a signature, a profile for Σ is a map associating a positive integer
with each uninterpreted sort of Σ. These numbers will be treated as upper
bounds on the sizes of the sets interpreting sorts in the models we construct.
Algorithm 39 (SetOfSupport).
input: theory T and profile prf
output: a stream M1,M2, . . . of minimal models of T such that for any
prf -model P |= T , there is some i such that Mi - P.
initialize: set theory T ∗ to be T ∪ {δprf }
while T ∗ is satisfiable
let M be minimal model of T ∗
output M
set T ∗ to be T ∗ ∪ avoidM
3.3 Working with an SMT Solver
This section treats some of the practicalities of using a SMT solver as a tool to
build models.
3.3.1 Getting a Model from the Solver
Once the solver has determined that a theory T is satisfiable, and computed—
internally—a model for T , the application must extract the model from the
solver. But the API for doing this—in the solvers we are familiar with—is
quite restricted. In any event, SMT-Lib compliant solvers are not required to
make this process particularly convenient. Quoting from the SMT-Lib Standard
(v.2.6) [BST+10]
The internal representation of the model A is not exposed by the
solver. Similarly to an abstract data type, the model can be inspected
only through the three commands below. As a consequence, it can
even be partial internally and extended as needed in response to suc-
cessive invocations of some of these commands.
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The three commands alluded to are
• get-value, taking a list of closed quantifier-free terms and returning a
corresponding sequence of terms designating values. The notion of “value”
is theory-specific; for example, for the theory of arithmetic the values are
the numerals.
• get-assignment, a certain restricted version of get-value.
• get-model, returning a list of definitions specifying the meanings of the
user-defined function symbols.
In this case the definitions are given in terms of the solver’s internal rep-
resentation of model-values.
This is inconvenient for us, for several reasons. First, for an uninterpreted
sort there is no theory-defined notion of value. Second, since the solver might
create only a partial model internally, Razor may not have all the information
it requires (for example for minimization).
To address this, we first ensure that the language we use to communicate
with the solver has enough ground terms at each sort to name all elements of
a model. We expand on this point in Section 3.3.2. Once this is done, we can
query the solver for the values of all functions and predicates, see Section 3.3.3.
Finally, in Section 3.3.4 we present a convenient data structure for maintaining
models.
3.3.2 The Fresh-Constants Approach
Suppose we have asked the solver to generate a model for theory T , over a
signature Σ. We first build an enriched theory T+ as follows.
1. Determine a bound, at each uninterpreted sort S, on the number of ele-
ments in the model(s) at the sort.
2. If the bound at sort S is n, add fresh constants {c − 1, . . . , cn} to the
signature, resulting in an expanded signature Σ+
3. Add to the theory a set of sentences, one for each uninterpreted sort S
expressing the constraint that every element of sort S is equal to one of the
ci. Note that in a given model it may be the case that distinct constants
name the same model element.
Then the (bounded) models of the original theory are precisely the reducts
to Σ of the models of T+.
3.3.3 Querying the Model
Since everything is now named by a term (indeed, a constant) we can work
with the solver according to the standard, as follows. Suppose the solver has
determined T+ to be satisfiable. Here’s what we do to scrape a model M out of
the solver.
36
1. We know that every element of M is named by one of our canonical con-
stants ci.
2. First query the solver for (enough) answers to M |= ci =? cj to get a set
of representatives for the domains of M.
3. For each predicate R and appropriate argument vector ~c of representatives,
query M |= R(~c). The solver will reply “true” or “false” and so this
collection of queries defines the meaning of R in the model.
4. For each function f and appropriate argument vector ~c and possible answer
c of representatives, query M |= f(~c) = c. The solver will reply “true” or
“false” and so this collection of queries defines the meaning of f in the
model.
We can then build a “basic” model representation
equations ci = cj and
equations f~c = c and
facts R~c
where the ci range over the Razor constants.
An improved representation is given in the next section.
3.3.4 Making the model representation convergent
Suppose we put a total order ≻ on K, the Razor-generated constants, and
declare that for every f, c and c′, f(. . . , c, . . . ) ≻ c′. We can then make a
convergent ground (terminating and confluent) rewrite system out of a model
representation by
• turning each C-equation and D-equation s = t into a rewrite rule s→ t if
s ≻ t.
• reducing each rule using the others, and
• iterating this (since the process may create new rules).
This process is guaranteed to terminate, in a system of rules:
equations f~c→ c // C-rules
equations ci → cj // D-rules
which is ground convergent.
The D-equations make an equivalence relation on the Razor constants. The
constants occurring on the right-hand sides make a set of canonical representa-
tives of M elements.
Since the system is self-reduced, ie, each right-hand side of a rule is irre-
ducible by all the rules and each left-hand side of a rule is irreducible by all the
other rules, the C-rules mention only the canonical representatives.
Also, these are precisely the set of constants that occur in any of the C-
equations.
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3.4 Alternative Approaches
In this section we describe alternative approaches to the problems of model
extraction and a-minimization.
There are actually two distinct problems addressed here:
• getting a model out of the solver, and
• a-minimization
They are described together here because the solutions have been imple-
mented together in the same version of Razor, and it is easier to present them
together.
3.4.1 The Enumerated Types Approach to Model Extraction
We describe an an alternative approach to building models, which was in fact
the first method we implemented. The idea arose as a solution to problems
described in Section 3.3.1 for obtaining a complete representation of a model
once the solver has determined that a theory is satisfiable.
One solution to this problem was described in Section 3.3.2. Another is
described here, as Algorithm ET-First. Roughly speaking, we translate unin-
terpreted sorts into enumerated sorts, thereby ensuring that every element of
the sort is named by a term denoting a value. We can then use the get-value
solver function described above to query the solver.
3.4.2 Another Exhaustive Search Approach to a-Minimization
We also show here an approach to a-minimization different from Algorithm 38.
This algorithm, Algorithm (ET Last), starts with a given model M, and com-
putes a sequence of i-minimal models, each one constructed to be outside the
a-cone of the previous. If and when a final such model K is reached, it is guar-
anteed to be a-minimal. Since: to say that K is a final model in the sequence
is to say that there are no models of T outside the cone of K; and if P were
strictly below K in the - ordering then P would violate that property. If T is a
theory with a finite set of support, this technique is guaranteed to compute an
a-minimal model.
The use of i-minimal models in this method is not essential for its correctness,
but we do this for efficiency: i-minimization enlarges a model’s avoid-cone (even
though the cone is defined in terms of a-homomorphisms) and so decreases the
numer of iterations required before arriving at a final model.
Algorithm 40 (Enumerated Types).
input: theory T
output: a stream of minimal models comprising a set of support for T
ET(T ) ≡
1. M← ET first(T ).
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2. If T is unsatisfiable, return.
3. N← ET last(T, 〈M〉).
4. Output N.
5. T ′ ← T ∪ avoid cone(N).
6. ET(T ′).
Algorithm 41 (ET First).
input: theory T
output: a model of T or UNSAT
ET first(T ) ≡
1. If T is unsatisfiable, return UNSAT.
2. Extract domain D from prover.
3. Replace the uninterpreted sorts in T with enumerated types to form
theory T ′. The domain D is used to determine the number of scalar
constants within each enumerated type.
4. Ensure T ′ is satisfiable.
5. M← get model(T ′).
6. Return an i-minimization of M (cf. Algorithm 29).
Algorithm 42 (ET Last).
input: theory T
output: a set of minimal models comprising a set of support for T
ET last(T) ≡
1. T ′ ← T ∪ {avoid cone(M) |M ∈M}.
2. N← ET first(T ′).
3. If T ′ is unsatisfiable, return head(M).
4. N ← filter out of M models with a homomorphism from N.
5. Return ET last(T, 〈N〉 §N).
The avoid cone function returns the avoid cone associated with a simplified
version of the model. Simplification is crucial for performance reasons.
avoidM
def
= ¬homFromM
3.5 Results
Early implementations of lpa had errors. At each step in the lpa algorithm, the
model finder must produce a model that describes a skeleton. Early implemen-
tations were node-oriented, and it took a while to identify the correct skeleton
axioms. A missing axiom meant that the skeleton extracted from model finder
output was not accepted by cpsa. The axioms are now finely tuned to assert
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Test ET US
Name Time Sat Cks Time Sat Cks
Needham-Schroeder (NO) 1.67 14 14 1.67 8 7
Needham-Schroeder (SO) 1.43 34 12 1.26 9 8
Reflect (NO) 2.82 11 32 1.89 6 9
Reflect (SO) 1.45 10 30 0.56 5 7
DoorSEP (SO) 4.32 26 60 37 4.92 9 10 24
Table 1: lpa Results
only what is needed to obtain valid skeletons, however, notice that there is a
fairly large number of universally quantified formulas that make up a protocol
theory.
The performance of early implementations of lpa was miserable. It was
immediately clear that efficient model finding is essential, motivating the ex-
tensive work described in this chapter. The first viable algorithm developed
(Algorithm 40) is called ET for Enumerated Types, and the second one (Algo-
rithm 39) is called US for Uninterpreted Sorts.
Early work with the ET algorithm showed the performance advantage of us-
ing a strand-oriented goal language, but throughout, we retained the capability
to use a node-oriented language.
A huge performance boost came to the ET algorithm by compressing the
representation of a model a described in Algorithm 34. The US algorithm always
compressed representations.
Intuition suggests that the US algorithm will outperform the ET algorithm,
and tests bear out that intuition. For each test of lpa, we collected the cpu
runtime in seconds, and for each invocation of the model checker, we recorded
the number of satisfaction checks requested of Z3.
Table 1 shows the results of running lpa on three protocols: Needham-
Schroeder, Reflect, and DoorSEP. Reflect is the simplest protocol we could
come up with that has two shapes. See Figure 9. NO indicates the use of the
node-oriented language and SO is for the strand-oriented language. Notice that
US always makes far fewer satisfaction checks, and tends to run faster than ET.
DoorSEP with the node-oriented language does not terminate in a reasonable
amount of time. Analyzing DoorSEP requires three invocations of the model
checker. It is the third invocation of the model checker that fails to terminate,
however the performance of the second invocation of the model checkers shows
the superiority of the US algorithm. It took 1.65 seconds as opposed to 54.21
seconds used by ET. For the equivalent strand-oriented problem, it took the
US algorithm 1.11 seconds as opposed to 3.41 seconds used by ET. Thus ET
was 16 times faster solving the strand-oriented problem.
Attempts to use lpa on larger protocols proved futile. Larger protocols have
a larger set of skeleton axioms. When Z3 looks for a model, it must instantiate
each universally quantified variable with each element in its domain. The result
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init resp
•

{|B|}
A−1 //
•
{|A|}
B−1oo
{|B|}
A−1 // •

•
{|A|}
B−1oo
Point of view: responder receives {|B|}A−1
A−1 and B−1 are uncompromised
resp init
• •
{|B|}
A−1oo
resp resp init
•

•
{|A|}
B−1oo
• •
{|B|}
A−1oo
Figure 9: Reflect Protocol and Shapes
is an exponential growth in the resources used by Z3 to find a model. Our
results show that na¨ıve model finding modulo strand space theory is only viable
for very small protocols.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the mechanisms needed for finding minimal mod-
els efficiently in the preorder of all homomorphisms, or in the preorder of em-
beddings. We have described an implementation of these methods in Razor that
orchestrates Z3 to compute the models. Moreover, we have shown how to share
labor between Razor and cpsa so that the latter can apply its authentication
test solving methods, while Razor is handling the remainder of the axiomatic
theory of the protocol together with some non-protocol axioms.
The project explored several algorithms for finding minimal models. A sig-
nificant improvement was described in Section 3.2.6, which explains how to
optimize the construction of the sentence avoidA that characterizes the cone of
models to avoid a given model. Tests show that the Uninterpreted Sorts algo-
rithm (Algorithm 39) outperforms all others. This algorithm is implemented in
a program that can be used outside the lpa framework.
The project identified an axiomatic theory for each protocol that is finely
tuned so as to allow Z3 and cpsa to communicate. The theory makes it so
that well-formed skeletons can be extracted from Razor models and given to
cpsa. With these theories, we successfully analyzed the DoorSEP protocol
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which includes a trust axiom. Unfortunately, as the size of a protocol grows, so
does the size of its theory, and especially its number of universally quantified
variables. Z3 becomes very slow when given a large theory. Thus we found that
the lpa architecture, as currently implemented, cannot scale to handle nearly
all problems of interest.
In future work, we would like to reorganize the software architecture as well
as the selection of logical theories to deliver to the components. Z3 is reduced
to a molasses-like consistency when given reasonably large domain sizes and a
theory with as many universal quantifiers as appear in our protocol theories.
This motivates an architecture in which only subtheories are delivered to Z3,
preferably governing smaller parts of the domain.
Thus, one would like to do more reasoning locally with a successor to cpsa.
Part of this reasoning can take the same form as generating the current cohorts,
i.e. applying authentication test-like reasoning to handle authentic and secure
channels, mutable global state, and to apply security goals ascertained in pre-
vious runs. Moreover, explicit logical axioms may also be handled in the same
way, when they are in the form of geometric sequents:
Φ =⇒
∨
i∈I
∃yi . Ψi,
where Φ and the Ψi are conjunctions of atomic formulas, and particularly in
the favorable case that the index set I is either a singleton or else the empty set
I = ∅. In that favorable case, the inference does not require a case split, but
only adding information. In these situations, a cpsa-like program can certainly
saturate its skeleton-like partial models. It can then call out to Razor to obtain
minimal models of portions of the theory that involve modest domains and
limited numbers of nested universal quantifiers.
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